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Abstract 
This study examined the effect of including a human figure drawing on the 
hindsight bias among undergraduate psychology students. Six groups were 
given a description of a 15 year-old boy who was experiencing school 
difficulties . Some of these groups also were given outcome information 
suggesting that the boy's difficulties were due either to social-emotional 
problems or to learning problems . In addition , some groups also were given a 
human figure drawing made by the boy. Participants then assigned likelihood 
probabilities to the two outcomes. Results of non-parametric analyses showed 
the hindsight bias for only one of the six groups. In contrast , results of 
parametric analyses showed a main effect for the outcome variable . Results 
are discussed in terms of previous research on the hindsight bias. 
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A common argument for using human figure drawings as part of a 
psychological test battery is that, at best, they might provide some clinical 
information or at least help to establish rapport with a client , and , at worst , they 
might prove irrelevant (Fuller & Goh, 1983; Kennedy , Faust , Willis , & Piotrowski , 
1994; Lubin, Larsen, & Matarazzo , 1994; Piotrowski , Sherry , & Keller, 1985; 
Piotrowski and Zalewski , 1993). Given the considerable research (Arkes, 
Wortmann , Saville, & Harkness, 1981; Chapman and Chapman , 1967; Fischhoff, 
1975; Fischhoff and Beyth , 1975; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990) examining the effect 
of biases on the accuracy of clinical decisions, however , it is reasonable to 
wonder if including irrelevant data could potentially exacerbate bias. Because the 
hindsight bias is well documented , it could provide a useful methodology for 
assessing this hypothesis . Thus, the goal of the present study was to assess 
whether the magnitude of the hindsight bias would be affected by including a 
human figure drawing. 
In the following review, the Draw-a-Person Test (OAP) first is discussed as 
a measure of cognitive ability and then of social-emotional functioning. Included 
is an examination of various techniques that have been developed to score the 
OAP. Next, a review of the research of the hindsight bias is presented. The 
original work of Fischhoff (1975) is described , as well as works that developed 
from his original paradigm. Finally , the two topics are integrated to form the 
research questions considered . 
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The OAP as a Measure of Cognitive Ability 
Although study of the use of drawings to estimate intelligence extends 
back to the 1880s, the first standardized method was developed in 1926 by 
Florence Goodenough with her Draw-a-Man Test. Goodenough (1926) proposed 
that there was a relationship between children 's concept development as seen in 
drawings and general intelligence . According to Goodenough , drawing, to a child, 
is language, and children draw what they know , rather than what they see. She 
observed that the developmental trends of drawings are remarkably constant 
among young children (ages 4 to 10 years) . Finally, she observed that children 
with cognitive impairments produce drawings resembling those of younger 
children . 
Based on these assumptions and observations , Goodenough developed 
an objective scoring system that was standardized using 4,000 drawings. 
Although the majority of her sample was from schools in New Jersey , several 
ethnic groups were represented from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds . 
The result of this study was a 51-point scale for measuring intelligence from 
human figure drawings . 
Goodenough (1926) found inter-rater and test-retest reliabilities ranging 
from rs= .70 to .90. Comparison of IQs estimated from the drawings with scores 
from the Stanford-Binet across separate age groups resulted in an average 
correlation of r = . 76. In addition, prognosis for school success by teachers and 
scores from the drawings were compared and resulted in a correlation of r = .60. 
From this work , age norms were developed for children ages 4 to 1 O years . It 
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was intended as a method of measuring nonverbal intelligence , particularly useful 
with non-English speaking and hearing impaired children. 
In 1948, John N. Buck published a technique called the House-Tree-
Person (H-T-P) . He proposed that, in addition to measuring intelligence , 
drawings also could be used to measure personality factors. He postulated that 
the H-T-P measured cognitive function in a situation designed to activate non-
intellective aspects of the personality that seNe either to enhance or to diminish 
the efficiency of intellectual functioning . He further postulated that the method is 
a projective (or associative) one, portraying thoughts, feelings, and traits of the 
individual. To this end, he proposed that in order to interpret the drawings in 
terms of intellectual functioning , one also must interpret the projected personality 
aspects of the drawing . 
In a revised edition of the manual, Buck ( 1966) described standardization 
studies that were done when developing the scale for measuring intelligence. 
The standardization sample of 120 participants was carefully selected and ranged 
from what today would be termed severely mentally retarded to intellectually 
gifted. Buck described the classification procedure in this way: "The ultimate 
criterion for inclusion in a level of intellectual function was the clinically 
demonstrated level of intellectual function and not a score on one or more 
standard intelligence tests" (Buck, 1966, p. 8). These drawings then were 
analyzed, and a scoring system was developed . The resulting quantitative 
scoring system was outlined in 40 pages in the manual, followed by another 100 
pages describing qualitative interpretation, which already had been identified as a 
requirement of interpretation. In terms of the concurrent validity of the method, 
Buck reported correlations ranging from rs = .40 to . 70 with scores from the 
Stanford-Binet and the Wechsler-Bellevue , with higher correlations restricted to 
lower IQ groups (mean IQ= 70). There was no explanation of how estimates 
were obtained ; as noted , classifications were not based on standardized tests , 
but instead on clinical presentation . Overall , this method is difficult to use and 
lacks the empirical evidence to support its clinical and practical utility in a 
psychological test battery . 
The Goodenough-Harris Draw-a-Person Test (Harris , 1963) was an 
attempt to extend the age norms into adolescence and to devise different forms 
of the scale to include a woman figure , as well as a drawing of the self as a 
possible method for studying the emerging self-concept. Attempts to develop 
adequate norms with adolescents were not successful , providing support for 
Goodenough 's original assertion that after the age of 1 O years , drawings are less 
predictive of intelligence . 
More recently , analyses were conducted using the Buck and 
Goodenough-Harris scoring systems (Abell , Heiberger, & Johnson , 1994) . The 
researchers were interested in examining the relationship between these 
measures and scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised 
(Wechsler , 1981). Their results showed moderate correlations between 
Performance and Full Scale IQs and estimated standard scores from the two 
scoring systems , with the Buck system performing slightly better . Further 
analysis of these relationships revealed significant differences between the 
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estimated scores and WAIS-R scores . Both the Buck and Goodenough systems 
significantly underestimated all three IQ scores of the WAIS-R (i.e. , VIQ , PIQ, & 
FSIQ) . Overall , the authors concluded that the question regarding the use of 
drawings as a measure of cognitive functioning in adults remains equivocal and 
warrants further research . This review did not refer to the any of the previously 
mentioned concerns regard ing the Buck scoring system. 
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To address some of the concerns previously discussed , Naglieri ( 1988) 
developed the Draw-a-Person : A Quantitative Scoring System (DAP:QSS) . The 
purpose of the DAP:QSS was to provide a brief nonverbal measure of ability to 
be used either as part of a test battery or as a screening device. The scoring 
system used modern scoring criteria and was normed on a large stratified sample 
of 2,622 students across the United States ranging in age from 5 to 17 years . 
Each individual in the standardization sample provided drawings of a man, 
a woman, and the self. Scores provided include both a composite standard 
score , as well as standard scores for single drawings based on a 64-item scale. 
Age-related changes showed the fastest increase between ages 5 and 9 years , 
and then increased less rapidly. Thus , norms were developed for each age 
range, with quarter-year intervals for 5 through 8-year-olds, and half-year 
intervals for 9 and 10-year-olds. Ages 11 to 17 years were collapsed into a single 
group because their means were quite similar . The internal consistency for the 
composite scale ranged from rs= .83 to .89, whereas those for the individual 
drawings ranged from rs= .56 to .78. 
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Test-retest reliabilities ranged from rs= .60 to .89 across various age 
ranges for a four-week interval. These were calculated based on a small sample, 
so readers are cautioned to interpret them carefully. Both inter-rater and intra-
rater reliability estimates were high, ranging from rs= .86 to .97 for children in 
Grades 1 to 7. Older age ranges were not evaluated . The reported construct 
validity of the DAP:QSS was evaluated in two ways . First, the author suggested 
that there should be a developmental change in mean scores . They reported 
age-related increases in total raw scores for children ages 5 to 11 years. In order 
to establish concurrent validity , drawings were scored using the DAP:QSS and 
the Goodenough-Harris scoring system. Resulting correlations ranged from r = 
. 75 to .84. For Grades Kindergarten through 3, correlations ranged from rs = .28 
to .31, and for Grades 4 through 12, ranged from rs= .19 to .27. 
Overall , the methodology used to develop the DAP:QSS was sound . It 
provides an estimate of non-verbal ability with good reliability . Caution should be 
used when using it with children over the age of 11, as its efficacy has not been 
established with adolescents . In addition, whereas the rigor with which it was 
developed is impressive , its overall concurrent validity remains questionable . 
Kamphaus and Pleiss (1991) reviewed the DAP:QSS. They found that 
although this technique was adequately normed and showed good reliability , its 
concurrent validity with other comprehensive measures of children 's intelligence 
was mediocre. Willis ( 1992) also provided a review of this method. He 
concluded that the DAP:QSS was a well-developed screening measure of 
general nonverbal ability. Willis cautioned potential users , however , that the DAP 
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was neither developed nor validated as a social-emotional assessment technique, 
and should not be used as such . 
Over the past 75 years, there have been many techniques developed to 
measure intelligence with human figure drawings . These methods have 
demonstrated variable psychometric properties. In general, correlations are 
better for children of lower IQ levels, than average to above -average IQ levels . 
Review of various techniques leads to the conclusion that it is possible , using 
well-developed, adequately normed tests, to gather an estimate of non-verbal 
ability correlated with other standardized tests. These conclusions apply primarily 
to young children (ages 5-10 years) , as the current body of research does not 
lend support for valid interpretation of drawings of older children and adults . 
Overall, reliability tends to be good with recent tests, whereas concurrent and 
construct validity have been shown to be less impressive. 
The OAP as a Measure of Social-Emotional Functioning 
In contrast to its use in cognitive assessment, the use of the OAP in social-
emotional and personality assessment is based on the projective hypothesis 
(Frank, 1939). This hypothesis states that when an individual structures and 
organizes an ambiguous stimulus situation while creating a response , the given 
response will at least partially reflect some of the individual 's personality traits . 
The more ambiguous the stimulus, the greater the sensitivity of the projection 
process. It assumes that the more ambiguous the stimulus , the less likely it will 
elicit defensive reactions by clients . Anastasi (1988) suggested that projective 
test materials represent a mechanism by wh ich individuals reveal their needs, 
anxieties, conflicts , and thought processes . Major features of projective 
techniques include the following : (a) they represent disguised testing procedures , 
(b) they represent a global approach to the appraisal of personality, and perhaps 
most importantly , according to proponents , (c) they reveal covert , latent, or 
unconscious aspects of personality (Anastasi , 1988). 
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Over time, Goodenough and others (Buck, 1948; Hammer, 1958; 
Machover , 1949) began to use the OAP to assess social-emotional and 
personality variables. Hammer (1958) proposed that figure drawings would allow 
individuals to draw pictures of their inner worlds , where beliefs and personality 
characteristics could be expressed, and strengths and weaknesses exposed . 
Handler (1996) proposed several advantages to Draw-a-Person techn iques. For 
example , he stated that the OAP is an easy task for most individuals and that it 
usually elicits cooperation in the assessment process. He further suggested that 
because children with internalized disorders often do not demonstrate the ir 
difficulties overt ly, the OAP could provide an assessment of their discomfort . In 
addition , it could prove useful with individuals who are inhibited and non-talkative , 
because it is a relatively nonverbal task . It also allows the clinician to observe the 
client's functioning during an unstructured situation , and when compared with 
performance on a structured task , the clinician may be able to determine the 
extent to which the client needs external structure in order to function . Finally, he 
stated that the OAP has few age and intelligence limitations , and can be used 
with individuals from various socio-economic and cultural backgrounds . 
Projective drawings such as the OAP often are used to establ ish rapport 
during an interview or evaluation . Kennedy et al. (1994) surveyed school 
psychologists about their practice, and discovered that many clinicians state that 
they use projectives primarily as a method of generating hypotheses, with a 
smaller percentage suggesting they use them primarily to help establish rapport . 
Although these appear to be harmless uses of this technique , it is difficult to 
measure the impact these drawings may have on overall impressions and 
diagnostic decisions . For example , although well intended , clinicians may have 
limited awareness of the influence these drawings have on their diagnostic 
decisions . Aspel and Willis (1998) found that clinicians' appraisals of how 
information influences decisions often is inaccurate . 
Although the purpose of projectives usually is disguised , research on the 
illusory correlation has demonstrated that people may have preconceived beliefs 
about the meaningfulness of certain signs. Illusory correlation refers to a false 
belief in the association between variables . It can reflect either a belief in an 
association when one is absent , an overestimation of the strength of the 
relationship, or a belief of a relationship in one direction when it is actually in the 
opposite direction . Chapman and Chapman (1967), in a classic study of the 
illusory correlation, found that both clinicians and non-trained college students 
made similar inferences about the meaningfulness of particular signs in human 
figure drawings . They speculated that these signs led to particular associations 
about personality characteristics , regardless of the lack of empirical support for 
the validity of those signs. 
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With regard to the use of the OAP as a diagnostic tool , illusory beliefs 
could exert a significant impact on attempts to mislead the clinician. Specifically, 
if the client has any intention or inclination to be less than truthful, it may not be 
detected in the OAP and in fact may lead the clinician to disregard other evidence 
that may suggest the client is attempting to fake. For example, if the client has 
beliefs about the meaningfulness of certain signs in drawings and the clinician 
has similar beliefs, then it would be relatively easy to draw a "pathological " 
drawing . In addition , given the projective hypothesis, the clinician would be 
confident that the drawing represents covert or latent characteristics of the 
individual, and may ignore objective indicators of faking. 
Critique of the OAP as a projective test. Many methods of drawing 
interpretation have been developed; this discussion reviews some of the earliest 
work , and then considers how current research and study have used this 
information. In 1949, Karen Machover published her manual Personality 
Projection in the Drawing of the Human Figure. Its purpose was as a method of 
personality analysis based on the interpretation of human figure drawings . The 
premise outlined in the book was that the body is a vehicle for self-expression 
and that the drawing reflects the individual's self-perception. The picture 
represents the whole system of psychic values, specifically drives and needs . 
This theory was based on Machover's personal experience as well as those of 
colleagues she respected. Machover speculated that "all creative activity bears 
the specific stamp of conflict and needs pressing upon the individual who is 
creating " (p.4). Although clinical experience and observations are useful for 
generating ideas, scientific study is required to demonstrate the relationship 
between these observations and reliable and valid interpretation . 
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In describing the method that should be employed when using her system , 
Machover cautioned that interpretation should be done only by advanced practice 
psychologists with extensive training in psychodynamic theory. In addition, she 
recommended that interpretation should not be made in isolation , but instead that 
it should be considered in light of the whole clinical picture of the individual. This 
recommendation suggests that interpretation is subjective, in that it varies 
depending on the individual. Naturally, this raises concern about the reliability 
and validity of the measure . 
The manual does not refer to specific studies of the psychometric 
properties of the technique . Machover (1949) made reference to a comparison of 
drawing interpretations with Rorschach and handwriting analysis , stating that 
many of them were consistent. No explanation was offered about how this 
comparison was made, nor were any statistical analyses cited. In addition , 
Machover suggested that the method had been shown to be useful for prognostic 
purposes , yet she did not cite any studies evaluating this. 
In the manual, Machover referred four times to the interpretation of pointy 
fingers as suggestive of overt aggression or paranoid repression of aggression , 
yet she failed to cite any validation of this sign beyond her own clinical 
experience. As will be shown in the discussion of other methods , pointy fingers is 
one of many signs that have been interpreted , yet the original source , as well as 
those thereafter , failed to offer evidence as to the validity of the sign. 
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Overall , the method suggested by Machover (1949) lacks the 
psychometric study required to demonstrate its efficacy . The manual does not 
mention any use of control groups when developing the technique . In fact, 
Machover suggested that the frequency of particular signs should not deter the 
clinician from interpreting them. As an example , she referred to the interpretation 
of conflict in the treatment of hands as indicating lack of confidence in 
achievement and social contacts. She stated that the fact that this is often seen 
in drawings suggests that there is a high level of competitiveness in society and 
that individuals who exhibit this sign should be interpreted as such. In other 
words , the base rate of a particular sign should not influence the clinician 's 
interpretation of it. Clearly the lack of scientific validation , as well as inadequate 
control groups lead to serious concerns about the usefulness of this technique . 
Urban (1963) produced another handbook for the interpretation of signs in 
drawings . It was reportedly a summary manual of the work of Buck (1948), 
Goodenough (1926) , Hammer (1958), and Machover (1949). The author 
recommended that it be used only by those with background in dynamic 
personality theories to explore an individual 's inner recesses , denied , 
unacceptable , repressed impulses. He stated, "Acute observers always have 
been able to detect emotional connotations in art work" (Urban, 1963, p. 1 ). 
Although the manual did not offer any information about specific studies of validity 
and reliability , it did advocate the interpretation of specific signs as indicative of 
pathology . For example , pointed fingers are said to be suggestive of aggression , 
and crossed eyes as warnings of severe mental illness (Urban, 1963, p. 61). 
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Jolles ( 1964) published A Catalog for the Qualitative Interpretation of the 
House-Tree-Person . The manual cites Buck (1948), Hammer (1958) , and 
Machover ( 1949) as references. It offers specific interpretation of signs in 
pictures without referencing sources spec ifically. The manual did not refer to any 
psychometric study of the validity of the signs. Similar to the previously 
mentioned manual, the work suggests that large , spike-like hands are indicat ive 
of aggression and hostil ity. W ithout mention of specific study of this , the reader 
assumes that this sign (along with many others) has been translated from the 
original work of Machover (1949) , Buck (1948) , and Hammer (1958). 
Goldstein and Rawn (1957) studied interpretive signs of aggression in 
human figure drawings. They hypothesized that experimentally induced feel ings 
of aggression would elicit changes in figure drawings consistent with those signs 
suggested by Buck (1948) and Machover (1949) as indicators of aggression . 
These signs included line pressure , figure placement , and seven spec ific deta ils 
generally interpreted as representing aggression (including spiked fingers , slash-
line mouth , detailed teeth , clenched fists , nostril emphasis , squared shoulders , 
and toes in a non-nude figure). Their sample consisted of 39 male and female 
attendants in a state mental hospital. No other descriptors of participants were 
mentioned . 
Participants were ranked based on measurement of line pressure from 
their first drawing and , based on these rankings , alternately assigned to the 
experimental or control groups . In order to induce feelings of aggression , 
members of the experimental group were required to wait before drawing their 
second picture, and then were told they would have to work more hours with no 
salary increase . No standardized measure of aggression was given at this time, 
but was inferred based on "the multitude of spontaneous complaints " (p. 170). 
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Drawings before and after the aggression induction were compared , as 
well as the drawings of both of the control groups. They found that line pressure 
and figure size did not support the hypothesis as valid interpretive signs of 
aggression . They further reported that the seven sign indicators , when 
considered globally, did discriminate between the control and experimental 
groups , as well as before and after the aggression induction for the experimental 
group . They cautioned that none of the signs individually was a strong predictor , 
only the global ratings. Finally, they had two judges (trained psychologists) 
provide subjective impressions of aggression . These impressions proved to be 
poor predictors of members of the experimental group . In addition , these judges 
reported that they relied on line pressure and figure placement as indicators of 
aggression. 
The results of this study must be interpreted cautious ly for a variety of 
reasons. Of primary concern is the participant pool. Specific subject variables 
were not identified, including even basic descriptors such as age and gender 
distribution . The method by which aggress ion was measured also presents 
concern , because its validity was not assessed . Due to these kinds of 
methodological issues, at best these results offer equivocal support for the 
interpretation of drawings as indicative of aggression. 
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More recently , Naglieri, McNeish , and Bardos (1991) developed the Draw-
a-Person : Screening Procedure for Emotional Disturbance (DAP : SPED). In 
contrast with previously mentioned methods that relied on the projective 
hypothesis , the objectives of this method were to make interpretations based on 
scientifically validated norms. The authors stated that it was intended as a 
scor ing system made of items that easily and objectively can be scored . They 
also intended to develop a nationally normed system with demonstrated ability to 
differentiate between normal and disturbed populations. The reported use of the 
method was as a screening procedure to identify individuals for whom further 
evaluation is warranted . The authors cautioned that screening was the intended 
use and that it should not be used for diagnostic purposes . 
The resulting scoring system was a 55-item scale includ ing items taken 
from an extensive literature review, that occurred infrequently among normal 
individuals, and demonstrated good psychometric properties . Scoring rules are 
clear and objective . Global scores are obtained and compared to norms, using T 
scores . According to the manual , scores less than 55 suggest further evaluation 
is not warranted , scores of 55-64 suggest that further evaluation is indicated , and 
scores above 65 suggest that further evaluation is strongly indicated . One issue 
that should be considered regarding these cutoffs is the fact that using T scores , 
a score of over 55 (assuming a normal distribution) would represent over 30% of 
the population. The manual did not report the base rate in the population of 
children needing evaluation for emotional problems, but clearly 30% is unusually 
high. 
16 
The DAP:SPED was standardized with 2,260 individuals aged 5 to 17 
years. lntrarater (over a one month time period) and interrater reliabilities were rs 
= .83 and .84, respectively. Test-retest reliability was I= .67 over a one-week 
time interval. The validity of the system was assessed by four separate studies. 
The first study compared mean scores of 81 students in special education 
{with emotional and behavioral disorders) with students from the standardization 
sample. Mean T-scores were 55.3 for the special education group and 49.5 for 
the standardization group. These scores were reliably different from each other, 
and the authors concluded that the DAP:SPED validly discriminated between 
these two groups . 
The second study used a similar methodology , with the clinical sample 
drawn from a class for students with serious emotional disturbances . Again , 
results showed mean T-scores of 57 for the clinical sample and 49 for the 
standardization group , a reliable difference. The third study used similar 
methodology, with the clinical sample being drawn from students in special 
education classes for students with emotional disturbances. Comparison of mean 
T-scores for the clinical (54.8) and standardization (49.7) groups yielded a reliable 
difference . Again , the conclusion was drawn that the DAP:SPED was a good 
discriminator between the groups. 
The fourth and final study was similar to the others. The clinical sample 
was a group of 54 students with serious emotional disturbances who were 
enrolled in a day school program. Mean T-scores for the clinical (56.6) and 
standardization (49.9) groups once again were reliably different , offering support 
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for the DAP:SPED 's discriminatory power. This study was reviewed both in the 
manual and separately (Naglieri & Pfeiffer, 1992). Whereas the results reported 
in the manual are consistent with those in the article , the authors did not mention 
the fact that when group membership was assessed based on a T score cutoff of 
55, 78% of the standardization group , yet only 48% of the clinical group were 
correctly identified . 
Overall , the DAP:SPED is a carefully designed , well normed scoring 
system. It demonstrates good reliability , much improvement over its 
predecessors. Yet questions regarding its val idity remain. For example, the 
authors caution many times in the manual that it is a screening procedure only, 
and should not be used for diagnostic purposes . They state clearly that it can 
help to determine what children may need further evaluation . Yet, review of the 
four studies reported in the manual, that used children with serious emotional 
disturbances in self-contained classrooms , demonstrated that these groups just 
barely reached the cutoff score of 55. Therefore , these studies suggest a 
minimal effect size for the clinical group. The clinical implications of the use of 
this method include the possibility that individuals who are in need of further 
evaluation may not score in the clinically significant range based on this scoring 
procedure and therefore will not receive further evaluation . The risk of false 
negative results is substantial , and clinicians should be aware of this when using 
this method. Conversely , the DAP:SPED is better at correctly identifying 
individuals who are not in need of further evaluation , with over 70% of 
participants in the standardization group scoring in the non-clinical range. 
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Riordan and Verdel (1991) have suggested that in addition to the OAP's 
use with a standardized scoring method, it also provides clinically useful 
information without a scoring system. They reviewed the use of the Oraw-a-
Person to predict sexual abuse in children. They did not refer to any specific 
scoring method or procedure to be used for interpretation . They reported specific 
signs in children's drawings that suggest that sexual abuse has occurred (e.g., 
eyes closed or without pupils, nose overemphasized , elongated neck). Yet , they 
offered only qualitative evidence and did not cite empirical support for these 
assertions. In addition , they advocated that the OAP could be used by non-
trained individuals as an assessment measure of definite indicators of sexual 
abuse. Given the lack of empirical support for these assertions , this report 
should be interpreted cautiously . 
Feyh and Holmes (1994) attempted to replicate early studies of the 
predictive power of particular signs on the OAP with children with conduct 
disorders . They used eight indicators of aggression identified by Koppitz (1966) 
and Machover (1949). Their results failed to replicate earlier reports , with no 
differences in the frequency of particular signs between children with or without 
conduct-disorders . 
Although these techniques continue to be used frequently by clinicians in 
psychiatric clinical settings and in schools (Fuller & Goh, 1983; Kennedy et al. , 
1994; Lubin et al., 1984; Piotrowski et al., 1985; Piotrowski & Zalewski , 1993), 
questions about their reliability and validity persist. Those methods reviewed have 
been cited in more recent manuals for the interpretation of human figure drawings 
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(Ogdon, 1990). It is interesting to note that the original works suggested that 
further studies need to be conducted , yet the previously mentioned recent manual 
primarily referenced these sources. 
Given the multitude of research questioning the usefulness of the DAP as 
a measure of social-emotional functioning , and yet the tendency for clinicians and 
non-trained individuals to interpret it based on intuitive beliefs, its inclusion in a 
psychological test battery raises serious concerns. Specifically , the risk of 
diagnostic errors is significant. In addition , it is the responsibility of professionals 
(e.g., school psychologists) to caution other team members about the risks of 
including the DAP in an assessment battery. 
Diagnostic accuracy can be influenced by many different variables . For 
example , cognitive biases have been demonstrated to exert a negative effect on 
accuracy . One well-researched cognitive bias is the hindsight bias. The 
following discussion considers this and its potential effect on decision making . 
Hindsight Bias 
The hindsight bias is a phenomenon that has strong empirica l support 
(Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). The term refers to the tendency to overestimate 
probability estimates for a given outcome once the outcome is known (Hawkins & 
Hastie, 1990). Individuals who are provided with outcome information and then 
asked to estimate how likely they would have estimated an occurrence tend to 
overestimate the likelihood that they would have applied to the given outcome . In 
contrast , individuals without outcome information tend to assign lower 
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probabilities to the same outcome. Fischhoff (1977) described this as a "knew-it-
all-along effect " (p. 349) . 
Study of the hindsight bias has reflected the original paradigm established 
by Fischhoff (1975). In his original study, he used four obscure events, two 
historical events, and two clinical-psychology cases . For each of these between-
groups experiments he provided a brief description of the event followed either by 
a list of possible outcomes (foresight) or a sentence presenting the actual 
outcome (hindsight) . Participants then were instructed to assign probabilities of 
likelihood of occurrence to each outcome as if they did not have outcome 
information . 
Fischhoff (1975) used the nonparametric sign test for his analysis. Results 
showed that individuals with outcome information overestimated the probabilities 
they would have assigned if they had not had outcome information. Their beliefs 
about the accuracy of their decisions were , therefore, influenced by the presence 
of outcome information. Fischhoff proposed the term "creeping determinism " (p. 
288) to describe a process by which outcome information immediately and 
automatically is integrated into a person's knowledge about the events preceding 
the outcome. People, without realizing it, incorporate the outcome into a 
plausible explanation about why the end result had to occur . The effect of this, 
as represented in probability estimates , is to perceive the outcome as inevitable . 
It seems as though people seem unable to recapture their original estimates of 
likelihood of outcomes once they have outcome knowledge . 
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Following these results, Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) examined the effect of 
the hindsight bias on current news events . They varied the previous studies by 
using a within-groups design , in which participants assigned foresight 
probabilities . After the outcome was known, participants were asked to 
remember their original probabilities , as if they did not have outcome information . 
The instructions for this experiment expl icitly stated "give the same probabilities 
which you gave then (two weeks ago)," (p. 5) thereby addressing the possibility 
that participants misunderstood what they were supposed to do. 
Again , these researchers found a significant hindsight bias. Participants 
rated events they believed had occurred as more likely in hindsight than they had 
in foresight, and rated events they believed had not occurred as less likely in 
hindsight than they had in foresight. Careful examination of the results showed 
that 75% of the participants remembered having assigned higher probabilities 
than they actually had to events that they believed had happened. Moreover, 
57% of participants reported lower probabilities for events they believed had not 
happened. 
Arkes et al., ( 1981) attempted to replicate the work of Fischhoff with 
physicians making medical diagnoses. They used a case description of a 
frequently encountered medical problem, followed by four possible diagnoses . 
The physicians were required to assign likelihood estimates to each outcome , 
equaling 100. There were four hindsight groups , each one told that one of the 
four diagnoses was the true outcome . Likelihood estimates were examined using 
nonparametric analyses (sign test). Results demonstrated that the physicians 
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demonstrated the hindsight bias. Yet the bias was restricted to the two 
diagnoses assigned the lowest likelihood estimates in foresight. These results 
were consistent with previous research suggesting that the hindsight bias is 
strongest for events initially judged to be least plausible (Fischhoff, 1977; Wood , 
1978). 
Synodinos ( 1986) conducted a between-groups study of this bias using a 
gubernatorial race in Hawaii. The researcher was interested in several issues. 
First , he hypothesized that participants would be more confident and assign more 
accurate probability estimates of percentage of votes in hindsight than in 
foresight. In addition , he hypothesized that , in hindsight , people with greate r 
political involvement would be motivated to distort their answers in the direction of 
the "knew-it-all-along " effect more than people with lower political involvement. 
This hypothesis relates to the role of self-esteem as a motivational factor in the 
bias. 
Participants were required to fill out a questionnaire assessing their degree 
of interest, level of knowledge , and perceived importance of the election . They 
then were asked to assign a percentage of statewide votes that they believed 
each of three candidates would receive (or had received , in hindsight) in the 
election (estimates must equal 100% for all three candidates) . Finally, the 
participants were asked to indicate their degree of confidence in their predictions. 
The researcher used parametric statist ics to analyze the results . Although the 
comparisons were in the predicted direction , they did not consistently reach 
significance . Synodinos suggested that the participants' accuracy in their pre-
election (foresight) estimates allowed little room for distortion. Participants 
indicated a significantly higher level of confidence in hindsight than in foresight. 
The researcher suggested that subjective measures of confidence may be more 
sensitive measures of the hindsight effect , and suggested calling it a "sure-all-
along" effect (p. 116). 
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Pennington ( 1981) questioned whether the effects found in laboratory 
studies would generalize to real-life , current , news events . He used a British 
firefighter 's strike as the news event to be studied. As with the previous studies , 
Pennington provided participants with information about possible outcomes (e.g., 
terms of the settlement and length of strike), and elicited probability estimates in 
foresight and at two times in hindsight. Results supported Fischhoff's work in that 
the participants demonstrated the typical hindsight pattern of greater probability 
associated with the true outcome in hindsight compared with fores ight. Also 
included in this study was a condition in which participants were required to 
generate their own possible outcomes in foresight. In this case , the typical 
hindsight bias was not demonstrated , although results suggested a trend in that 
direction . This is an early example of a technique used to decrease the bias. 
Finally, Pennington found that when he provided more detailed descriptions 
(several hundred words) to participants at the time the judgments were made, the 
hindsight effect was stronger than when a brief (150 words) summary of the strike 
events was presented . 
Although the hindsight bias has been observed fairly consistently , these 
studies also suggest that there may be techniques to control or minimize the 
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effect. This early research provided a good framework for future studies and 
identified potential factors that could account for the hindsight bias, such as 
temporal setting (past or future), cognitive processes , and the possibility that 
when participants are required to generate spontaneous outcomes, the hindsight 
bias may diminish (higher level of processing of information). These factors 
stimulated further research (e.g., Arkes et al., 1988; Connolly & Bukszar, 1990; 
Creyer & Ross, 1993; Fischhoff , 1976; Pohl & Hell, 1996; Schkade & Kilbourne, 
1991; Sharpe & Adair, 1993), and the latter concept has been useful in the 
consideration of debiasing techniques (e.g., Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart , 
1988). 
Arkes et al. (1988) evaluated a technique for eliminating the hindsight bias. 
They used the classic hindsight paradigm , using foresight and hindsight groups , 
and requested estimations of likelihood of diagnoses . They added an additional 
condition whereby some participants in each group were required to generate 
reasons , based on the case description, about why they assigned the 
probabilities they did. Results suggested that when required to provide reasons 
for decisions, participants ' susceptibilities to the hindsight bias decreased. This 
study provides support for the assertion that there are techniques that can 
diminish the effects of the hindsight bias. 
In a review of this literature , Hawkins and Hastie (1990) concluded that the 
basic effect of the hindsight bias, higher retrospective probabilities associated 
with reported outcomes, is supported across a variety of tasks, and varying time 
intervals (minutes to weeks) between initial judgments, outcome , and second 
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judgments. They suggest that the cumulative research of this phenomenon 
indicate, in most cases, that the hindsight bias can be observed. In addition, the 
implications for its effect on decision making can be substantial, because it can 
hinder the detection of errors, inflate errors, bias future decisions, and lead to 
unduly influenced second opinions. 
In an effort to condense the wide body of research on the hindsight bias, 
Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) conducted a meta-analysis of 122 
studies. They stated that because the prevalence of the bias has been well 
established , they were interested in identifying personal or task characteristics 
that may moderate the level to which the bias is present , and in evaluating the 
practical significance of the bias. The variable analyzed was estimations of effect 
size, as this would demonstrate the degree to which the phenomenon was 
present in the population (Cohen, 1977, pp. 9-10). The actual test statistics were 
transformed to effect sizes, either as Cohen's d or the Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficient ( r). 
The study considered several moderator variables. The first variable was 
whether or not the outcome occurred. The researchers referred to Fischhoff and 
Beyth's (1975) observation that the hindsight bias seemed to be more 
pronounced when people were told that an event had occurred than when told 
that it had not occurred. They hypothesized that this was due to people's 
cognitive difficulty in processing negative information. The second moderator 
variable considered was the participants familiarity (experience or expertise) with 
the topic being studied. Two other moderator variables (problem difficulty and 
event novelty) were discussed but not directly evaluated , because data were 
unavailable to examine them . 
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Results of this analysis found the average effect size of all 122 studies 
was r = .17, with a 95% confidence interval of r = .14 to .20. Therefore , they 
found support for the phenomenon of the hindsight bias, although its observed 
effect size was small. They further discovered that the size of the effect was 
correlated with both the participants' familiarity with the task and whether the 
outcome information stated that the event did or did not occur. Specifically , they 
discovered that the more familiar the participants were with the task, the smaller 
the effect size. In addition , in hindsight, people were less likely to reduce their 
likelihood estimates when told than an event did not occur , than they were to 
increase their likelihood estimates when told that an event did occur. 
Post-hoc analyses uncovered an interesting phenomenon . They found 
that studies that used an unfamiliar task-event occur model were nearly all paper 
and pencil tasks using college undergraduates (in contrast with more 
professionals used in familiar task cases). Analysis of these undergraduate 
studies suggested that question format might be a moderating variable of the 
hindsight bias. Case-history problems generated an average effect size similar to 
the familiar task effect size (small effect) , whereas almanac questions generated 
an average effect size that was nearly three times larger than any other observed 
in the meta-analysis. The present study used undergraduate students and the 
case-history model ; therefore these observations are relevant here . 
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Research Questions 
The purpose of this study was to see if the inclusion of projective 
information would increase the magnitude of the hindsight bias. A premise of the 
study was that projective techniques (e.g., DAP) are measures of limited clinical 
utility, and, in fact , actually may serve to decrease the overall accuracy of 
diagnostic decisions. The primary quest ions addressed were: 
1. Will the probabilities assigned to reasons for difficulty be similar, regardless of 
whether outcome information is provided (replicat ion of hindsight bias 
research) . 
2. To what extent is the hindsight bias influenced by the inclusion of projective 
data? I hypothesized that features that are inherent in projective techniques, 
such as the ambiguous nature of stimuli and subjective scoring and 
interpretation , would combine with the process of creeping determinism to 
make the outcomes with the drawing seem inevitab le to participants, resulting 
in higher likelihood estimates given by participants who received hindsight 
information and a drawing. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 180 undergraduate students at the University of Rhode Island 
volunteered to participate in this study from a number of different choices 
designed to prov ide them with experience in psychological research . They 
received psychology course credit in exchange for their participation . Sign-up 
sheets were designed so students who had participated in another study on the 
hindsight bias being conducted during the same semester were excluded. 
Participants were matched for gender , and randomly assigned to one of six 
groups , for a total of 30 per group. Appendix A shows the consent form for 
research the participants were required to sign. 
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The mean age of the sample was 19.5 years, with a standard deviation of 
2.5 years . Within each condition , the age distribution was similar . The 
distribution of gender was 28.9% male, and 71.1% female . Participants' race was 
distributed as follows: 84.1% Caucasian , 5.7% African Ame rican, 4.0% Hispanic , 
and 6.2% Other; of the 180 participants , four did not provide information 
regarding race. Most participants (80.6%) received credit for an introductory 
psychology class, whereas 2.8% were from a sophomore-level course, and 
16.6% were from a junior or senior-level psychology course . These variables 
were distributed similarly across the six different conditions . 
Case Materials 
The following was a case description constructed to portray a 15 year-old 
boy who was experiencing school related difficulties . It provides information that 
often is included in psychoeducational reports , but in a style appropriate for 
understanding by non-professionals : 
We would greatly appreciate your taking a few minutes to 
read the following case description , which is part of a study on 
identify ing reasons for school-related problems . It is the kind of 
case that often is refeffed for evaluation to psychologists who 
work in school settings. We would like you to decide what 
probability you would have assigned to each of two possible 
reasons, had you been the school psychologist evaluating the 
case. 
A teacher expressed concern about a fifteen-year old boy 
who has been earning failing grades in school and who appears 
isolated and withdrawn. One exception to this observation, 
however, is that he recently had two uncharacteristic arguments 
with peers that resulted in teacher intervention. 
A review of his background information indicates that he 
has had trouble both in the past and more recently. Leaming to 
read was difficult for him, and he required extra help in both the 
first and second grades. He has never been a good reader, and 
rarely reads for pleasure. His grades reflect these difficulties. 
He is generally a C student, although his reading and language 
arts grades have occasionally been Os, with one F. In recent 
years, he has struggled with both his English and Spanish 
classes. In contrast, he consistently has eamed Bs in Math, and 
he describes this subject as interesting and relatively easy for 
him. In addition, he always has been described as a nervous 
boy, getting uptight before exams and oral presentations. 
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He is reported to be an avid basketball fan, both as a 
player and observer . Over the past several months, however, 
his interest in basketball has diminished. His teachers and 
friends describe him as gloomy lately, and state that he does not 
seem to be interested in things he normally enjoys. 
He recently was referred to the school psychologist who 
conducted an evaluation of these school-related difficulties . If 
you had been the school psychologist evaluating this case, what 
is the probability you would assign to each of the following two 
possible reasons for the school-related difficulties as the primary 
one? Assign an estimate to each, making sure they add to 
100%. 
Social-emotional problem 
(e.g., moodiness , difficulty relating to others, 
problems with expressing feelings) 
Leaming problem 
-----
- - -- -
(e.g., slow learner , problems with attention or 




In order to determine if the reasons for difficulty identified subsequent to 
the case description were approximately equally likely, the case was piloted with 
15 graduate students in psychology (8 school-psychology and 7 clinical-
psychology students). The mean probability assigned to social-emotional 
problems as the primary difficulty was 53.9% (SD= 16.7%, range= 25% to 75%), 
and learning problems was 46.1% (SD= 16.7%, range= 25% to 75%). A 1-test 
for dependent samples showed that the reasons generated were generally 
perceived as equally likely (1 < 1 ). 
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A drawing of a person also was developed (see Appendix B). Included in 
the drawing were signs often interpreted as suggesting either social-emotional 
problems or learning problems (Machover , 1949; Ogdon, 1990). For example , 
pointy fingers frequently are interpreted as signs of aggression , and have been 
suggested to indicate severe mental disturbance (Buck , 1948; Machover , 1949; 
Urban, 1963). Shoulders omitted often are seen as indicating feelings of 
inferiority or depression , and crossed eyes have been interpreted as indicative of 
learning or cognitive difficulties. When evaluated using the OAP: Quantitative 
Scoring System (Naglieri , 1988), the drawing represents a measure of nonverbal 
cognitive development that is within normal limits (Standard Score = 107; M = 
100, SD= 15). In addition, when scored using the OAP: SPED (Naglieri, 
McNeish, & Bardos, 1991) the drawing is not considered to be clinically significant 
(T-score = 40; M = 50, SD= 10). Thus , it is reasonable to infer that the drawing 
does not clearly reflect empirically supported interpretation as either 
developmentally or psychosocially pathological. 
Procedure 
The design for this study is illustrated in Table 1. Participants were 
matched for gender , then 30 were assigned to each of six conditions : (F1) a 
foresight condition with no drawing ; (F2) a foresight condit ion with a drawing ; (H1) 
a hindsight condition for learning problems with no drawing ; (H2) a hindsight 
condition for social-emotional problems with no drawing; (H3) a hindsight 
condition for learning problems with a drawing; and (H4) a hindsight drawing for 
social-emot ional problems with a drawing . The 30 participants in the foresight 
condition were given the case description previously described. 
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Each of the two hindsight groups had an extra sentence inserted between 
the two sentences in the first paragraph of instructions to the foresight group. The 
two sentences (one for each of the hindsight groups) were as follows : "This is a 
description of a boy who is experiencing difficulties primarily due to emotional 
problems , " or "This is a description of a boy who is experiencing difficulties 
primarily due to learning problems ." 
Foresight-drawing group participants received the same descriptive 
information as the foresight participants , except that a drawing of a person was 
inserted after the final paragraph , preceded by the statement: "During the 
evaluation , he made the following drawing ." The two hindsight-drawing groups 
differed from the hindsight ones in a similar way. 
This study included two independent variables and one dependent 
variable . The independent variables were : (a) drawing , and (b) outcome. The 
dependent variable was the probability assigned for each of the possible reasons 
for difficulty, ranging from 0 to 100%. 
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Results 
Figures 1 through 6 show the frequencies of probabilities for social 
emotional problems and learning problems by each group . Table 2 shows the 
mean probability assigned to each possible reason by each group. Also included 
in the Table {in parenthesis) is the number of participants whose probability for 
each reason exceeded the corresponding foresight estimate . I used two different 
statistical methods to analyze these data: one non-parametric and the other 
parametric . Because the probabilities for each outcome in the present study were 
ipsitive for each participant (i.e., r g = 100%), these dependent measures clearly 
were related. Thus , I used the non-parametric (distribution-free) procedures 
employed in previous hindsight bias studies {e.g., Arkes et al. , 1981; Fischhoff , 
1975). As an alternative analysis , I isolated one level of the dependent variable 
(i.e., Q values assigned to social-emotional problems) and analyzed these 
measures using parametric statistics (analysis of variance). 
Non-parametric Analysis 
I used the sign test to compare the number of participants who assigned 
higher probabilities in hindsight than the probabilities assigned in foresight. The 
sign test is a procedure that computes the differences between two variables for 
all cases and classifies the difference as either positive , negative , or tied. If the 
two variables are distributed similarly, then the number of positive and negative 
differences will not differ significantly (Glass & Hopkins, 1996) . My results 
demonstrated that , overall , 73 out of 120 (i.e., 61%) hindsight participants 
assigned higher probabilities to the known-to-have- occurred outcome than the 
corresponding foresight estimate (i = 2.28; p = .011 ). 
I also conducted separate sign tests for the following hindsight vs . 
foresight comparisons: (a) no drawing, and (b) drawing . In the no drawing 
condition , 37 out of 60 (i.e., 62%) of the hindsight participants assigned higher 
probabilities to the known-to- have-occurred outcome than in the corresponding 
foresight group (i = 1.68; Q = .047) ; whereas , in the drawing condition 36 out of 
60 (i.e., 60%) participants assigned higher probabilities~= 1.42; Q = .078) . 
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Finally, I also compared hindsight versus foresight probabilities within each 
drawing by outcome condition , that is: (a) drawing, social-emotional ; (b) drawing, 
learning; (c) no drawing, social-emotional ; and (d) no drawing , learning. In the 
drawing, social-emotional group , 22 of 30 (i.e., 73%) of the hindsight participants 
assigned higher probability estimates to social-emotional problems than the 
corresponding foresight group ~ = 2.41; Q = .008). In the drawing , learning group, 
14 of 30 (i.e., 47%) of the hindsight participants assigned higher probabilities than 
the foresight group (i = .44; Q = .330. In the no drawing, social-emotional group, 
18 of 30 (i.e., 60%) of the hindsight participants gave higher estimates than the 
corresponding foresight group (i = .91; Q = .181 ). In the no drawing, learning 
group, 19 of 30 (i.e., 63%) of the hindsight participants assigned higher 
probabilities than the corresponding foresight estimate~= 1.28; Q = .100). My 
results demonstrate that the only individual group that demonstrated the bias (at 
Q < .05) was the hindsight for social-emotional problems with the drawing group. 
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Parametric Analysis 
I also analyzed the data with a two by three between groups analysis of 
variance test (ANOVA) . The design was Ax B, where A= drawing (two levels: 
either drawing or no drawing) , and B = outcome (three levels : no outcome given , 
social-emotional problem, or learning problem) . To address the previously 
mentioned concern regarding the dependence of the two probability estimates 
provided by each participant , the probability est imate assigned to social-emotional 
problems (versus learning) arbitrarily was chosen as the single dependent 
variable . The ANOVA showed a main effect for the outcome variable, E (2, 174) 
= 5.273 , Q = .006, but not for the drawing variable , E (1, 174) = 3.364, Q = .068, or 
for the interaction between these two variables , E < 1. The ANOVA summary 
table appears in Table 2. As a follow-up analysis , I used the Tukey Honestly 
Significant Difference Test (Tukey HSD). This analysis compared each of the 
three outcome groups . I found that the only comparison that yielded a significant 
result was the hindsight condition for learning problems compared with the 
hindsight condition for social-emotional problems (Q = .003). 
Finally, I examined the results of the ANOVA to determine effect size of 
the significant result as well as the power of the non-significant results. The 
method for calculating effect size was omega-squared, measuring the proportion 
of variance accounted for (Keppel , 1982). For the outcome variable ro2 was .057, 
a small effect. I examined the power of the non-significant result to examine the 
likelihood of Type II errors, that is how likely it was that this design did not detect 
an effect of the drawing or interaction , when one in fact was present. The power 
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of the drawing condition was moderate (P = .554). This implies that if an effect of 
the drawing was present , it was 55% likely that my study was not powerful 
enough to detect it. The power of the interaction was quite low {J3 = .923). In 
terms of the likelihood that I would have found a significant interaction if it were 
present , my chances were minimal, or it was 92% likely that I would not detect an 
effect if it were present. Therefore , the interpretation of the non-sign ificant result 
is potentially misleading. Further study will need to consider this issue in order to 
decrease the likelihood of a Type II error . 
Discussion 
These results provide support for the first research question , regarding the 
replication of previous research on the hindsight bias. As noted, many different 
methods have been used to measure the hindsight bias. Both parametric and 
non-parametric statistics have been used. Consistent with Arkes et al. (1981) 
and Fischhoff (1975) , my study demonstrated the hindsight bias using the non-
parametric sign test. The bias was limited to one specific hindsight condition , the 
hindsight social-emotional with drawing group . 
Arkes et al. (1981) and Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) also found the bias to 
be present in only some of their groups . They concluded that the hindsight bias 
tends to be stronger for those events initially judged to be least plausible (low 
base-rate events). In the present study, each outcome was deemed equally likely 
given the data provided (approximately 50/50 as indicated by the pilot study and 
the foresight , no drawing estimates) . Therefore , other explanations should be 
considered . Pennington (1981) suggested that more data tend to increase the 
hindsight bias. This explanation is not supported by the present study. In fact , 
the opposite was observed in terms of the drawing vs. no drawing groups. The 
no-drawing group demonstrated the bias, whereas the drawing condition overall 
did not. 
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If the observations of Ark es et al. ( 1981) and Fischhoff ( 197 5) are 
generalizable, that least plausible outcomes tend to demonstrate the bias, 
whereas higher base-rate outcomes are less likely, then the logical question may 
be: Why did the drawing social-emotional group demonstrate the bias at all? 
Perhaps there was something inherent in the kind of information given. If the 
DAP tends to be interpreted in terms of emotional functioning more frequently , 
then the hindsight information may have become more salient to participants than 
it was in the other conditions. The projective hypothesis , advocating subjective 
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli, combined with the concept of creeping 
determinism , may offer a plausible explanation . To reiterate , creeping 
determinism refers to the observation that reporting an event 's occurrence 
increases its perceived inevitability . If participants in my study, in fact, were 
susceptible to the effects of this cognitive process, and the ambiguity of the 
drawing was persuasive enough to encourage bias toward social-emotional 
problems, then the bias would be expected as observed. This question could be 
evaluated further in subsequent research . 
Characteristics of the sample population also may provide insight into the 
observed results. Specifically , there may be differences in the way professionals 
38 
and nonprofessionals analyze case histories. Although undergraduate students 
have been used in previous research of the hindsight bias, it has been shown that 
they are more likely to demonstrate the bias when considering historical or 
almanac data than case-history data (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham , 1991; 
Fischhoff , 1977). 
The second research question I was interested in asked to what extent the 
hindsight bias was affected by inclusion of the OAP. The results of the ANOVA 
suggest that the outcome information had a significant overall effect on assigned 
probabilities. Specifically , the combined hindsight learning groups (with and 
without drawing) differed reliably from the combined hindsight social-emotional 
groups (with and without drawing). Each of these means were in the expected 
direction, with the hindsight social-emotional group assigning probabilities to 
social-emotional problems higher than 50 and the hindsight learning group 
assigning probabilities lower than 50. 
The drawing condition overall did not demonstrate a reliable effect on 
likelihood estimates. Yet , when the drawing was presented with social-emotional 
outcome information , estimates were significantly higher than when the drawing 
was presented with learning outcome information . This suggests that the 
combined effect of the type of outcome information (social-emotional problems) 
and the drawing exerted an effect on the way the case information was 
interpreted. In other words, simply including the drawing with the outcome 
information for social-emotional problems persuaded participants to interpret the 
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case information differently . An interesting follow-up to these observat ions would 
be to examine the incremental validity effect of the drawing . 
In addition, it may also be useful to examine more closely the differential 
effect of the DAP on cognitive versus social-emotional information . For example , 
a majority of the literature on the DAP refers to its use as a measure of social-
emotional functioning . The Chapmans ' ( 1967) study demonstrated that the 
presence of drawings elicits stereotypes of social-emotional functioning by both 
trained clinicians and untrained college students . For the purpose of this study , 
the drawing that was used was given to a group of students in an undergraduate 
psychology class . They were asked to provide qualitative descriptors of the 
drawing . All of the students made statements about the person who drew the 
picture, even though that was not the instruction given . In addition, 98% of the 
statements referred to the social-emot ional functioning of the person who drew 
the picture, whereas only a few referred to cognitive functioning . A sample of 
these statements appears in Appendix C. This is an interest ing observation, 
because the DAP is a better predictor of non-verbal cognit ive functioning than of 
social-emotional funct ioning . The influence of the picture on the way other 
information is interpreted should be considered by practicing clinicians who claim 
that the worst effect will be no effect at all. This question also should be 
considered further in subsequent research . 
The observed effect size of the outcome variable was consistent with 
results reported by Christensen-Szalanski and Willham's (1991) meta-analysis of 
122 studies of the hindsight bias. They found an overall small effect size for the 
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hindsight bias. Within that analysis , Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) 
examined several moderator variables and found that the hindsight effect was 
correlated with both the participants' familiarity with the task and whether the 
outcome information stated that the event did or did not occur . They concluded 
that the more familiar the participants were with the task, the smaller the effect of 
the hindsight bias. In addition, they observed that people were less likely to 
reduce their probability estimates retrospective ly when told that an event did not 
occur, than they were to increase their likelihood estimates retrospectively when 
told that an event did occur. 
Christensen-Szalanski and Willham (1991) also examined subgroups of 
their sample. A large number of studies were conducted using undergraduates . 
These studies tended to demonstrate the bias more than any other group (i.e., 
the average effect size demonstrated a medium effect). Within this group, they 
found that students who were given case-history problems (such as in the 
present study) generated a small effect size, whereas almanac type questions 
generated an average effect size nearly three times larger than any other that 
was observed. Therefore , my results are consistent with those found in the meta-
analysis. 
A potentially confounding influence in this design is that the amount of 
information in the case-description-plus-drawing conditions is greater than the 
case-description-only conditions. As noted, previous research has suggested 
that as amount of information increases , the magnitude of the hindsight bias is 
likely to increase (Pennington , 1981). Pennington 's study compared longer 
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versus shorter verbal descriptions , whereas this study examined the inclusion of 
additional information in the form of a drawing. Within the drawing condition , the 
bias was observed only in the group that was given social -emotional outcome 
information , suggesting that another explanation should be considered . Due to 
the differential effects that were observed , isolat ing potential reasons for such 
differences (e.g., illusory beliefs based on projective information versus 
differential amounts of information) should be addressed in subsequent research . 
Given the fact that the observed hindsight bias was in the minimal range, 
one must consider the cost of this cognitive error in daily functioning when 
deciding whether or not to attempt to decrease its effect. Although the results of 
this study are consistent with previous research , it would be of both theoretical 
and practical interest to see how practicing psychologists would respond in a 
similar situation. In addition , the issue of the potential differential effects of the 
OAP depending on the type of information (case versus almanac) included with it 
should be evaluated further . 
Implications 
My study provided support for the hindsight bias consistent with previous 
research. When non-parametric statistics and effect size analyses were used, 
the bias was observed . The combined strength of these methods lead to a fair 
degree of confidence in asserting that the bias is, in fact , present. In contrast , 
parametric tests , that compared the actual observed means of the foresight and 
hindsight groups , did not demonst rate the bias. The concern regarding the 
relatedness of the probability estimates is a valid one. With my use of parametric 
statistics I attempted to diminish the effect (by using only the probabilities 
assigned to social-emotional functioning). 
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I have identified an issue here that has not been addressed in previous 
study of the hindsight bias. Specifically, given the differential results I observed 
when using parametric versus non-parametric statistics, study of the statistics of 
other hindsight bias research is warranted. Perhaps the bias is not as robust as 
previously believed . Alternatively , the construct of hindsight bias may be 
understood differently based on varying methodology . When non-parametric 
methods are used, one compares the number of participants who assigned higher 
probabilities than the mean foresight estimate , whereas the parametric methods 
compare actual means. 
Another important result of my study was the observation that the OAP 
demonstrates a differential effect based on the kind of information with which it is 
presented. Given the vast amount of information provided during a 
psychoeducational evaluation, there remains a substantial risk that clinicians will 
be susceptible to the same cognitive errors demonstrated by this college 
population . As noted previously , clearly the worst effect is more significant than 
no effect. In fact, these kinds of beliefs actually can increase the likelihood that 
errors in diagnosis will occur. 
Finally, it is important to consider the applied usefulness of the results I 
have presented. Although some equivocal results were observed, it is clear that 
individuals are susceptible to cognitive biases like the one I have reviewed . In 
addition, depending on analytic technique , projective methods (specifically the 
DAP), exert an observable influence on how individuals interpret other 
information . Given these observations , and the implications for faulty decision 
making and diagnosis, these issues should be examined using practicing 
clinicians. 
Limitations 
There are limitations to this study that should be considered when making 
implications based on the results. In this study I considered one dependent 
variable, thereby potentially restricting the observation of the hindsight bias. As 
noted, Synodinos (1986) used both probabilities and degree of confidence as 
dependent variables. Synodinos reported that confidence might be a more 
sensitive measure of the hindsight effect, because it directly addresses 
participants ' perceived accuracy . Although Fischhoff (1975) has clearly defined 
the hindsight phenomenon, perhaps further consideration of the construct itself 
should be considered. 
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It is important to use caution when making inferences about a particular 
population. Specifically, although my study demonstrates susceptibility to the 
hindsight bias and the negative impact of the DAP, the generalizability of these 
observations is questionable. It remains unclear how practicing clinicians would 
consider the same information used here. Naturally , in a real evaluation situation, 
the clinician would have access to more information than is included here. 
Consequently , although these results are interesting , their relevance to actual 
diagnostic situations remains questionable . 
44 
Conclusion 
This study considered the effect of the inclusion of a human figure draw ing 
on the hindsight bias. A review of the development of the Draw-a-Person test 
suggests that its clinical usefulness and psychometric properties are limited . 
Contrary to previously expressed belief about the benign effect of inclusion of the 
DAP, it was demonstrated that the OAP can exert an observable influence on the 
way in which other information is interpreted . In addition , this study examined the 
construct of the hindsight bias and proposed that the different methods of 




Design of the Study 
No Outcome Given Social-Emotional - Learning-
Problems Outcome Problems 
Given Outcome Given 
¼ assigned to 5-E ¼ assigned to 5-E ¼ assigned to 5-E 
problems problems problems 
No Drawing 
¼ assigned to teaming ¼ assigned to teaming ¼ assigned to Given 0roblems problems ~earning problems 
'°/4 assigned to 5-E '% assigned to S-E ~1/o assigned to 5 -E 
problems 1Problems problems 
Drawing Given 
¼ assigned to learning % assigned to learning % assigned to 
oroblems problems ~earning problems 
Table 2 



































Note. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants whose 




Analysis of Variance Summary Table for Comparisons of Hindsight Bias and 
Projective Drawing Conditions 
Sum of Mean 
Square df Square F Sig. 
Drawing 1467.756 1 1467.756 3.364 .068 
Outcome 4601 .633 2 2300 .817 5.273 .006 
Drawing X Outcome 152.878 2 76.439 .175 .839 
Error 75920.73 174 436.326 
Total 97348.00 180 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 4 
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The University of Rhode Island 
Department of Psychology 
A Study of Decision Making Strategies Among College Students 
CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH 
You have been asked to take part in a research project described below. 
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The researcher will explain the project to you in detail. You should feel free to 
ask questions . If you have more questions later , Elizabeth Dufresne (783-3909), 
the person mainly responsible for the study, will discuss them with you. You must 
be at least 18 years old to be in this research project. 
You have been asked to take part in the study that evaluates how people 
identify reasons for problems . If you decide to take part in this study here is what 
will happen: You will be given a brief description about an individual. You will be 
asked to answer a few questions about this description. In addition, you will be 
asked to fill out a questionnaire with various questions about you (age, year in 
college). 
We do not expect that there are any risks or discomforts associated with 
this study. If, upon completion of the study, you feel any discomfort, please 
contact the person mainly responsible for the study. 
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Participation in this study will fulfill partial requirements for your 
Introductory Psychology course. Appropriate documentation of your participation 
will be made upon completion . 
Your part in this study is confidential. None of the information will identify 
you by name. All records will be stored in a separate place from the consent 
forms so that confidentiality is maintained . 
The decision to participate in this research is up to you. You do not have 
to participate and you can refuse to answer any question. 
Participation in this study is not expected to be harmful or injurious to you. 
However , if this study causes you any injury, you should call Elizabeth Dufresne 
(783-3909) or W. Grant Willis , Ph.D., Faculty Adv isor (874-4245). 
If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed , you may 
discuss your complaints with Elizabeth Dufresne . In addition , you may contact 
the office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Studies , Research and Outreach , 70 
Lower College Road, Suite 2, University of Rhode Island, Kingston , Rhode Island, 
telephone : (410) 874-2635. 
You have read the Consent Form. Your questions have been answered. 
Your signature on this form means that you understand the information and you 
agree to participate in th is study. 





Sample Statements From Pilot of Drawing 
"The character looks stressed, which probably represents how he (the 
artist) feels ." 
"He feels inferior (on big piece of paper, drew small person). " 
"He is unhappy and confused ." ''Very attentive . Looking forward , big 
ears ." 
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"The eyes made me think that he is confused and overwhel med, stressed. " 
"He does not conform to standards and ideals-the number of fingers on the 
boy is not the standard 5." 
"The picture seemed sad so the boy might also be upset about 
something ." 
"The hands look monstrous , perhaps this boy has some anger or 
violence ." 
"Everything on the left side of the body is drawn bigger, perhaps this boy 
has some kind of body dysmorphic disorder. " 
"This boy has a low self-esteem - the hands are unique and the boy in the 
picture is not smil ing." 
"Mood of boy gloomy when he drew the picture ." 
"The boy is mentally disabled. " "He has delusiona l problems. " 
"He is unhappy when he drew this picture ." 
"The boy probably feels everyone has a monster inside of them ." 
"He is underdeveloped ." "Often when things are left out of a picture such 
as the neck and wrists that can be signs of a lower developmental level." 
"It is by a boy who is mentally retarded or autistic (some lack of 
intelligence)." 
"He is not that intelligent because body parts are not accurate. " 
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